209 research outputs found

    Agricultural Policy, Crop Failure and the 'Ruriganiza' Famine (1989) in Southern Rwanda: a Prelude to Genocide ?

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    The paper analyses the agricultural policy of the Habyarimana regime, which ruled Rwanda from 1973 to 1994. Econometric analysis of rural household survey data is used to investigate the effects of the 1989 crop failure in southern Rwanda on children’s health status. The paper shows that children in southern Rwanda are chronically malnourished, more then in other prefectures of Rwanda. It is shown that the 1989 crop failure developed into famine and the causes of this development are investigated. It turns out that the Habyarimana regime did not respond to early warnings of famine conditions and pretend it did not know what was going on. The relationship between this non-response to famine, agricultural policy in general and the 1994 genocide is demonstrated.agriculture, famine, survey research, Rwanda

    Rebel Recruitment in a Coffee Exporting Economy

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    Recent literature in the political economy of civil war has pointed to the importance of (changes) in the economic environment for the understanding of conflict dynamics. Three channels, negative income shocks, the presence of exportable commodities and indiscriminate violence inflicted on one’s community are considered as drivers of conflict. This paper studies these channels with a new fifteen-year panel of community level data on Burundi whose coffee sector is intimately intertwined with the civil war. We find that indiscriminate violence inflicted at the start of the civil war (1993) continued to affect recruitment throughout the entire civil war. We also find that decreases in the producer price of coffee increases recruitment. Aiming to distinguish the resentment aspect from the opportunity aspect in low producer prices, we perform robustness tests with different specifications and with year-province rainfall shocks affecting overall agricultural income, not just coffee. Results indicate that it is the opportunity cost mechanism that drives increased recruitment.Civil war, recruitment, indiscriminate violence, coffee, rainfall

    Poverty Dynamics, Violent Conflict and Convergence in Rwanda

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    Civil war and genocide in the 1990-2000 period in Rwanda - a small, landlocked, densely populated country in Central Africa - have had differential economic impacts on the country’s provinces. The reasons for this are the death toll of the genocide, the location of battles, the waves of migration and the local resurgence of war. As a result, the labour/land and labour/capital ratios at the provincial level changed considerably during that period. Using two cross-sections, we find empirical evidence for convergence between provinces following the conflict shocks: previously richer provinces in the east and in the north of the country experienced lower, even negative, economic growth compared to the poorer western and southern provinces. This has in turn affected significantly the dynamics of household poverty in Rwanda in the same period. Using a small but unique panel of households surveyed before and after the conflict period, we find that households whose house was destroyed or who lost land ran a higher risk of falling into poverty. This was particularly the case for households who were land-rich before the genocide. We do not find this for the loss of household labour. In the latter case the effect depends on the violent or non-violent character of the loss.Conflict, poverty, Africa, panel data

    A Phoenix in Flames? Portfolio Choice and Violence in Civil War in Rural Burundi

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    This paper challenges the idea that farmers revert to subsistence farming when confronted with violence from civil war. While there is an emerging macroeconomic consensus that wars are detrimental to development, we find contrasting microeconomic evidence. Using several rounds of (panel) data at the farm and community level, we find that farmers in Burundi who are confronted with civil war violence in their home communities increase export and cash crop growing activities, invest more in public goods and reveal higher levels subjective welfare evaluations. We interpret this in the light of similar recent micro-level evidence that points to post-traumatic growth effects after (civil) warfare. Our results are confirmed across specifications as well as in robustness analyses.Civil war, investment, post-traumatic growth

    Consumption Growth, Household Splits and Civil War

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    We analyse the effect of civil war on household welfare. Using Burundian panel data for the 1998-2007 period in which we re-interviewed original as well as newly formed households (split-offs), we show that headcount poverty decreased by 3.5 % points when split-off households are taken into account and 1% when splits are left out. Poverty is persistent while prosperity is not, in particular in war-affected areas. We find that 25 war-related deaths or wounded at the village level reduce consumption growth by 13%. We also find that violence afflicted on household members decreases growth whereas membership of rebel groups increases it. Apart from such war-related effects - and controlling for initial levels of consumption - we find that temporarily famine-induced migration and illness decrease growth while good harvests, more split-offs and higher initial levels of education increase it. Good harvests are found to have persistent positive effects on growth. Our results are robust for different household and province fixed effects specifications.Consumption, Growth, Split-off households, Civil war, Panel data, Africa

    The demographic and socio-economic distribution of excess mortality during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda

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    There is an extensive literature on violent conflicts such as the 1994 Rwandan genocide, but few papers examine the profiles of victims and perpetrators, or more broadly the micro-level dynamics of widespread violence. This paper studies the demographic consequences of the Rwandan genocide and how the excess mortality due to the conflict was distributed in the population. Data collected by the 2000 Demographic and Health Survey indicate that although there were more deaths across the entire population, adult males were the most likely to die. Using the characteristics of the survey respondent as a proxy for the socio-economic status of the family dead, the results also show that individuals with an urban or more educated background were more likely to die. Over and above the human tragedies, a long-term cost of the genocide is the country's loss of productive skills.Population Policies,Health Monitoring&Evaluation,Demographics,,Adolescent Health

    Child Survival and the Fertility of Refugees in Rwanda after the Genocide

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    In the 1960s and 1990s, internal strife in Rwanda has caused a mass flow of refugees into neighbouring countries. This paper explores the cumulated fertility of Rwandan refugee women and the survival of their children. To this end, we use a national survey covering 6420 former refugee and non-refugee households conducted between 1999 and 2001. The findings support old-age security theories of reproductive behaviour: refugee women had higher fertility but their children had lower survival chances. Newborn girls suffered more than boys, suggesting that the usual sex differential in child survival observed in most populations changes under extreme living conditions.

    Dictatorship in a Single Export Crop Economy

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    Is it a matter of pure altruism or shortsightedness when a dictator spends an increasing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption? In order to be able to consume, the dictator first has to stay in power. We present a formal model of a power maximizing dictator. His revenues depend on the exports of a single crop. With the export earnings the dictator buys loyalty from the producers of the export crop by setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from the diÂźerence between the international and the domestic price of the crop are used to finance a repressive apparatus. We characterize the optimal trade-oÂź between buying more loyalty and adapting the level of repression. The model is illustrated with a case study of Rwanda under president Habyarimana (1973-94).dictatorship, political economy, coÂźee, Rwanda.

    Dictatorship in a single export crop economy

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    Is it a matter of pure altruism or short-sightedness when a dictator spends an increasing amount of his revenues for the population, while cutting on own consumption? In order to be able to consume, the dictator first has to stay in power. We present a formal model of a power maximizing dictator. His revenues depend on the exports of a single crop. With the export earnings the dictator buys loyalty from the producers of the export crop by setting the domestic producer price. Revenues resulting from the difference between the international and the domestic price of the crop are used to finance a repressive apparatus. We characterize the optimal trade-off between buying more loyalty and adapting the level of repression. The model is illustrated with a case study of Rwanda under president Habyarimana (1973-94).dictatorship, political economy, coffee, Rwanda.

    Civil war, crop failure, and child stunting in Rwanda

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    Economic shocks at birth have lasting effects on children's health several years after the shock. The authors calculate height for age z-scores for children under age five using data from a Rwandan nationally representative household survey conducted in 1992. They exploit district and time variation in crop failure and civil conflict to measure the impact of exogenous shocks that children experience at birth on their height several years later. They find that boys and girls born after the shock in regions experiencing civil conflict are both negatively affected with height for age z-scores 0.30 and 0.72 standard deviations lower, respectively. Conversely, only girls are negatively affected by crop failure, with these girls exhibiting 0.41 standard deviation lower height for age z-scores and the impact is worse for girls in poor households. Results are robust to using sibling difference estimators, household level production, and rainfall shocks as alternative measures of crop failure.Youth and Governance,Population Policies,Rural Poverty Reduction,Children and Youth,Adolescent Health
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